Trojan Tactics

Trojan Tactics

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain comments on this piece You may disagree but I think Fahd Humayun needs compliments on his ability to articulate exactly what is required in Pakistan today. His emphasis on the non military aspects of the counter movement either COIN or CT hits the nail on the head. The employment of the clergy, exploiting the power of the mosque to slowly dilute the footprint of fascist radicalism, the drying up of financial conduits, the control of drug running, narcotics and arms, the recognition of criminal nexus and how jails can be used for producing fedayeen squads, manipulation of dissensions within the TTP et all are the methods which will work. Force on force, employing weaponry to dilute the lethality of the radically oriented TTP and using large size forces to fight the TTP in its own area which it knows so well, are not measures which will get the Pakistani establishment its gains.  I am not proffering advice to Pakistan on how to fight its terrorists. I am recognizing the identified aspects which our own establishment has refused to recognize. Ours has been a force on force approach in Kashmir and the Red Corridor. There has been no doctrine specific to the problem. Perhaps we need to take a leaf from the analysis by this young Pakistani who I happened to meet recently. He gave me no inkling of his cerebral capability. Shouldn’t that be worrisome to us; a young Pakistani from its premium think tank, with no ground exposure to CT is able to articulate a counter narrative for the Pakistan Government. I am not sure how many young people from our think tanks have that capability to appreciate which way our policy on Kashmir and the Red Corridor should move.    Access to Jinnah Insitute’s write ups is a good way of assessing Pakistan’s strategic thinking. By Fahd Humayun                   Last week the PM teetered on the knife-edge of launching a full-scale military operation in North Waziristan. For the first time in months it seemed as if the PML-N had finally come of age and commenced its climb up the...

Jammu and Kashmir, Where Are We And Where Are We Going ?

Jammu and Kashmir, Where Are We And Where Are We Going ?

Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM**, VSM**  Commentaries on Kashmir have been the flavor of the season ever since Shekhar Gupta’s article in Dec 2013 suggested that the time was ripe for the Army to vacate the hinterland and restrict itself to the LC in J&K, declaring a ‘victory’ of sorts for the Indian State. A series of articles in response by informed military leaders argued that there was no question of a victory against our own people and that the Army was as yet relevant. This is because the conflict stabilization stage in J&K was still existent. Any decisions about diluting the Army’s role in the stabilization process would need to be taken in the light of the potential situation in the region as the draw down and vacation of Afghanistan is commenced by the ISAF in Afghanistan. These decisions need not be taken under pressure of adversarial propaganda about the presence of disproportionate strength of the Army in J&K. We also need not be pressurized about the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) presence or begin to think that its job is over because the residual strength of terrorists is extremely low. It needs to be remembered that the RR was raised for a purpose. Some claim it was to defeat insurgency while the truth actually points to the fact that it was raised for the purpose of re-integrating J&K with India; the task of re-integration has not yet been completed and therefore the necessity of the RR’s presence in Kashmir remains. Currently the main theme of all discussions on Kashmir is the likely effect of the withdrawal of the ISAF by end of 2014. Will it see a repeat of the events of 1989 which witnessed the inception of militancy and entry of foreign militants in Kashmir? The less informed are assuming that Kashmir will see much more turbulence in 2014-15. However, it perhaps may be  incorrect to template 1989 to 2014. The situation is vastly different. There are very few mercenaries in Afghanistan whose main commitment will be to assist the Taliban against the Afghan National Army without much attention towards Kashmir. The Pakistan Army will similarly be more...

A Dialogue with Agha Humayun Amin Major (r)

A Dialogue with Agha Humayun Amin Major (r)

Agha Humayun Amin Major (r) Tank Corps: 13 Years service in Pakistan Army (PAVO 11 Cavalry,29 Cavalry,58 Cavalry,15 Lancers,5 Independent Tank Squadron,14 Lancers,15 SP) and 31 years research . Ex Editor Globe , Ex Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Ex Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies. Publications: More than 200 articles in News, Nation , PRAVDA,Pakistan Army Journal , Citadel Magazine of Command and Staff College,Journal of Afghanistan Studies,Indian Strategic Review,Dawn ,Friday Times,Outlook Afghanistan ,Afghanistan Times,Frontier Post,Globe,Defence Journal,Media Monitors Network,Pakistan Army till 1965 held at US Army War College Library,US Army Command and Staff College Library,Indo Pak Wars a Strategic and Operational Analysis,Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted, The Essential Clausewitz,Man’s Role in History: Education/Credentials : Masters (History). Past/Present Clients: Various Think Tanks , Afghanistan Research Associates,Centre for Study of Non State Militant Actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Can you share some of the important events of which you were an active part in your Military Service? The first event was 1984 mobilization. Pakistan Army was in bad shape and would have come to certain grief if India had attacked. We were mobilized and concentrated at Qila Sobha Singh near Pasrur. Tanks were in bad shape and the nuclear deterrent was not there. Only assassination of Indira Gandhi averted the disaster that Pakistan was sure to face. The second event was 1987 mobilization in face of Brasstacks. Again the Pakistani military was in bad shape but disaster narrowly avoided because Indians had no long term strategic vision. The Indians lost three golden chances to strategically reduce Pakistan in size in 1971, 1984 and 1987.Now Indians will reap the harvest of destabilization, which would be difficult to foresee as well as handle. What exactly do you mean by destabilization? When India avoided the chance to reduce Pakistan by size, then what exactly are you referring to by destabilization? India lost chances to deal with the Pakistan factor in 1971,1984 and 1987.With the nuclear deterrent now fully active India cannot impose any settlement on Pakistan. The threat of destabilization and a possible war will now increase because of following factors: A new Afghan civil war. US China rivalry in Pakistani Baluchistan. India Pakistan tensions over water. Greater religious...

Cameron is right – Ravi Shanker Kapoor

Cameron is right – Ravi Shanker Kapoor

We have been so badly brainwashed by Marxist historians, who fatten on Congress patronage, and dogmatic intellectuals that we are unable to see the past as it was—and view it from the prism made of Leftist biases and chauvinistic absurdities. Unsurprisingly, there are subjects that occasion jingoistic spasms and orgasms among us. The Jallianwalla Bagh massacre of 1919 is one of them. UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s refusal to apologize for the incident has many of us angry at his supposed insensitivity. This was despite the fact that he called it a “deeply shameful event in British history.” Later, he justified his refusal to saying sorry. He rightly pointed out that the incident took place 40 years before his birth and it would not be “the right thing to reach back into history and to seek out things you can apologize for.” Cameron’s position is right because acceptance of the position of those who want to correct the wrongs of history would open Pandora’s box—more such demands, more unnecessary controversies, much unpleasantness between nations, groups, etc. To begin with, if the British should apologize for the 1919 outrage, and maybe the 1857-58 atrocities and the Indian conquest before that, why shouldn’t same demands made on Iranians, Afghans, and many other Muslim invaders? Nadir Shah, termed the Napoleon of Persia, is still remembered for his general massacre (qatl-e-aam) in Delhi in 1739. In one single day, March 22, the Persian Emperor’s troops killed 20,000 to 30,000 Indians. The Mughal king at that time, Mohammad Shah, abjectly begged for the stoppage of the carnage. This was apart from the plunder Nadir Shah and his soldiers perpetrated. The booty included the fabled Peacock Throne and the Koh-i-Noor and Darya-ye Noor diamonds. Such was the magnitude of the loot that Nadir did not need to tax his subjects for three years. Yet, neither Iranians have ever said sorry for the conduct of their ancestors nor has anybody in India demanded any apology from them. A few years later, the hordes of Ahmad Khan Abdali, who is regarded as the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan, descended upon northern India. In the Third Battle of Panipat (1761), the...

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